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Abstract—Current trends forecast that Over-the-Air (OTA)
software updates will be highly significant for future connected
vehicles. The OTA software update will enable upgrading the car
functionalities or bug fixations in the embedded software installed
on its Electronic Control Units (ECUs) remotely. The introduction
of OTA updates in the automotive industry has brought many
advantages for both the Original Equipment Manufacturer
(OEM) and the driver. According to IHS Automotive, an auto-
industry data consulting company, the cost savings from OTA
updates for all the OEMs worldwide are estimated to grow to
over $35 billion in 2022. Therefore, many organizations in the
automotive industry are presently working on introducing OTA
updates as the fundamental feature of their vehicles, considering
the growing importance of such kind of updates. However, in
terms of security, OTA updates are highly critical as they need
complete access to the in-vehicle communication network for
installing the latest updates on the ECUs of a vehicle. The main
security issues are related to the attacks and threats of wireless
connected and update-capable vehicles.
This survey highlights and discusses remote OTA software
updates in the automotive sector, mainly from the security
perspective. In particular, the major objective of this survey is
to provide a comprehensive and structured outline of various
research directions and approaches in OTA update technologies
in vehicles. At first, we discuss the connected car technology and
then integrate the relationship of remote OTA update features
with the connected car. We also present the benefits of remote
OTA updates for cars along with relevant statistics. Then, we
emphasize on the security challenges and requirements of remote
OTA updates along with use cases and standard road safety
regulations followed in different countries. We also provide for
a classification of the existing works in literature that deal
with implementing different secured techniques for remote OTA
updates in vehicles. We further provide an analytical discussion
on the present scenario of remote OTA updates with respect to
care manufacturers. Finally, we identify possible future research
directions of remote OTA updates for automobiles, particularly
in the area of security.
Index Terms—Connected cars, OTA updates, Original Equip-
ment Manufacturer, On Board Diagonistic, Electronic Control
Units.
I. INTRODUCTION
The automobile industry has witnessed a major evolutionary
phase, from the generation of manual manoeuvred cars to
the ongoing development of connected cars [1], [2], [3]. It is
apprehended that by 2020, 75% of the cars in the world will
have wireless connectivity [4]. The connected car is one of the
application’s of Internet of Things, that have transformed the
driving experience of customers. Connected cars provide high
levels of safety and comfort. The car is able to anticipate the
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current traffic condition due to the enhancement in the degree
of automation, that has lead to the reduction in the workload
of the driver [5], [6]. The car companies are manufacturing
cars having advanced driver assistance systems that can guide
the driver’s behaviour or provide information about potential
crashes so as to reduce the chance of future risks while
driving [7], [8]. The future of connected cars are foreseen
as having high automation levels, where all the driving func-
tionalities may be taken over by the car [9]. The high level
of connectivity in connected car introduces a wide range of
new security threats as well as privacy concerns [10], [11],
[12], [13]. Therefore, we need a robust security architecture
for sustaining the connected car concept. Instances of security
compromise by hackers were shown in the past where modern
vehicles were attacked using their wireless interfaces [14],
[15]. For example, researchers were able to hack and remotely
stop a Jeep Cherokee on a highway [16] by compromising
radio signal, which triggered a recall of 1.4 million vehicles
by the Chrysler automobile company. More recently, in another
work, researchers were able to compromise and remotely gain
control of a Tesla Model S vehicle [17] by compromising wi-fi
connectivity, which triggered Tesla to introduce a code signing
protection into their cars. These realities of remote cyber-
attacks on vehicles has made automobile security as one of
the most vital issues [18], [19], [20]. Security of modern car
is a challenging job mainly due to complexity, numerous attack
surfaces, and unsafe and old technologies [21]. For the sake
of convenience, henceforth, we use the term ‘car’, ‘vehicle’
and ‘automobile’ interchangeably.
A modern vehicle contains several Electronic Components
Units (ECUs), that perform specific tasks including control-
ling the functions of engines, controlling the window lifters,
windscreen wipers [22]. The ECUs are interconnected with
each other via networks such as, Controller Area Network
(CAN) [23] or Local Interconnect Network (LIN) [24]. Since
the past decade, the computer based ECUs have substituted
many in-vehicle mechanical control systems. In 2013, a study
by Frost & Sullivan found that most cars in those times
consisted of 20 to 30 million lines of code for performing
certain controlling functions. From the study, Frost & Sullivan
analyzed that with the booming of digitalization and devel-
opment in technology will increase the investments to $82.01
billion by 2020 [25]. Software as well as hardware are involved
in the development of an ECU and perform the intended
functions necessary for a particular module [26]. Majority
of the ECUs in today’s market are developed following the
V-model. Also, ECU manufacturers are paying attention for
developing safety modules on the lines of standards such as,
ISO 26262 (functional safety) [27] and SAE J3061 (cyber
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2security) [28]. For automotive electric/electronic systems, the
ISO 26262 standard adapts from the functional safety standard
IEC 61508 [29]. In addition to ISO 26262 and SAE J3061
standards, two new standards are under development. One
of them is ISO 21434-Road Vehicles-Cybersecurity engineer-
ing [30]. This standard will mainly cover the basic require-
ments for updating in-vehicle ECUs. Whereas, the second one
is being developed by the United Nations Economic Commis-
sion for Europe (UNECE) World Forum for Harmonization
of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29). Precisely, the Working Party
on Automated/Autonomous and Connected Vehicles (GRVA)
under WP.29 is developing a recommendation document for
cybersecurity and OTA issues [31].
The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of the dif-
ferent parts of the vehicles have the obligatory task of
providing and managing the software efficiency throughout
the lifecycle of the vehicles. The OEM performs the func-
tions of ensuring improved performance as well as rectifying
faulty software/firmware (henceforth, software) that may prove
detrimental with regard to the safety and security of the
vehicles [32]. It is revealed that majority of the recalls are
due to software related problems. Therefore, OEM is liable
to take extra effort in reducing those problems arising due to
software malfunctions. A recent typical example of a recall is
that of Volkswagen, where, the company had to recall the 11
millions vehicles it has sold for the last eight years with faulty
emissions control software [33]. Whereas, if the problem was
solved using a software update by Volkswagen, the overall
process would have involved much less cost, minimized the
time taken and also reduced the impact on the environment.
Thus, through this real life example we can very clearly
understand the significance of remote software updates Over-
The-Air (OTA).
Similar to software updates for the smartphones, the soft-
ware update for various ECUs in connected vehicles is done
using OTA technique. It is an efficient and convenient method
to update the latest software in the vehicle as this technique
saves the visiting time of the customers to repair small bugs
in the software. Nevertheless, OTA updates will introduce
various new attack vectors [10], [34], [35], e.g., OBD-II,
Bluetooth, Wi-Fi for the malicious actors. Through these
attack vectors, malicious attackers exploit the OTA channel
to steal the latest updated software, to reprogram ECUs and
even control the vehicle remotely. The introduction of new
software capabilities has lead to the rapid improvement in
crash-avoidance features, such as lane departure warnings and
adaptive cruise control. All these new features are modifying
the way customers assess cars, giving more importance to
user experience and improved safety. These software-reliant
systems generally need continuous updates, such as, route
map changes, road construction information, changes to safety
features. The possibility of sharing unknown situations and
solutions collected from other vehicles already on the road, can
also enhance safety. OTA updates play a vital role in increasing
safety, by keeping driver-assistance features up to date.
Due to the strict vehicle safety standards of various coun-
tries [36], [37], cars are becoming more safe, at the same time
more electronic and software dependent than ever before. As
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Fig. 1. Comparing the number recall issues with number of Vehicles recalled
for the year 2006 to 2016.
the cars are becoming increasingly electronic and software
dependent, the number of recalls linked to electronic and
software failures has risen exponentially. Figure 1 presents
the comparison of number of vehicle recall issues occurred
due to various faults, e.g., bugs in the software and the
number of vehicles affected due to the recall, during the
period 2006 to 2016 [38]. The plot shows that since 2013,
the number of recall issues and number of vehicles recalled
has increased significantly. Particularly, the increase in number
of recalls is 8.04%, 22.61%, 11.79% and 7%, in 2013, 2014,
2015 and 2016, respectively. Most importantly, the increase
in number of recalled vehicles is 272%, 44.38% in 2014
and 2015, respectively. It indicates that although the increase
in the number of recall issues is quite less, the number of
recalled vehicles increases significantly. Overall, the number
of vehicles recalled during 2013 to 2016 ranges between
16.3 to 87.5 millions. Most importantly, another major global
marketing information system [39], listed 189 recalls only
due to bugs in software during the past 5 years that affected
more than 13 million vehicles. Volvo recalled 59,000 cars due
to a software issue that caused the engine and the electric
system to shut down while the car was in motion [40].
Honda recalled 350,000 vehicles due to a glitch in the parking
brake software [41]. GM recalled 4.3 million cars due to a
software issue that blocked the airbags from deploying during
an accident [42]. All these recalls could have been avoided
if there were OTA software updates. OTA updates not only
provide assistance for patching against security holes, but also
support patching against automotive glitches in software that
can cause malfunction in cars. OTA updates provide enormous
advantages in keeping in-vehicle software systems up-to-
date and maintaining consumer satisfaction. ABI Research,
the transformative technology innovation market intelligence
institute, predicts almost 203 million OTA supported vehicles
will ship by 2022 [43]. We list below the various advantages
of remote OTA updates in vehicles.
• Lower cost. OTA updates to systems in near real time,
without requiring the owner to bring the car to a dealer-
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Fig. 2. Adaptation of OTA process for updating software in different vehicle
entities and application in millions of vehicles during the period 2015-2022.
ship or mechanic, helps reduce warranty issues and recalls
across potentially millions of vehicles.
• Improved safety. Many under-the-hood systems, such as,
steering, braking, and acceleration are electronically ac-
tuated. These safety-critical systems can be immediately
updated using OTA technology when issues are identified.
• Improved customer satisfaction. Consumers are spared
the inconvenience of bringing their cars to a dealership
and they can receive the latest information and safety
updates, often without being aware of the change.
• Frequent updates. Especially, in situations that might
otherwise require a recall, OTA updates can be transmit-
ted to all vehicles, whether in the sales lot or on the road.
OTA updates allow manufacturers to update software as
frequently as necessary in near real time.
• Increased value. By consistently maintaining in-vehicle
software systems with OTA updates, the overall value of
the car increases and opens new revenue opportunities to
automakers. Also, software configuration costs decreases
when multiple software solutions use a single, compatible
operating system.
IHS Automotive predicts that automakers will save $35
billion by using OTA updates in 2022, up from $2.7 billion in
2015 [44]. Figure 2 presents the growth of adoption of OTA for
software updation by the automotive industry [4]. The automo-
tive industry has chosen five different entities and application,
i.e., ECU, Navigation map, Infotainment software application
(APP), Infotainment operating software (or, Infotainment) and
Telematic Control Unit (TCU) to update their software using
OTA process. Interestingly, the table shows that the growth of
OTA procedure for software updates in all the five components
is exponential.
a) Contributions: To the best of our knowledge, this
survey is the first to demonstrate the significance of OTA
updates in vehicular systems. The novelty of this survey is
in providing for a detailed description of the current status
of OTA updates in vehicles, together with the classification
of the existing works and outlining of future research in OTA
updates of vehicles. The main contributions of this survey are:
• We discuss the importance of OTA updates in vehicles as
well as provide for an overview of OTA updates.
• We provide a comprehensive discussion on the traditional
update and OTA update in vehicles, followed by the
issues and challenges faced by OTA updates. In addition,
we also discuss the use cases and the standard regulations
followed by the countries for vehicle safety.
• We classify the existing works in literature, based on their
commonality in approaches.
• We present a comparative study for the scientific works
in literature on vehicle OTA updates, together with the
OTA update scenario for car companies.
• We present promising directions for future research in
OTA updates for vehicles, particularly with regard to the
security aspects.
b) Organizations: The rest of the paper is organized
as follows. In Section II, we provide an overview of OTA
update in vehicles, together with discussion on security issues,
challenges and requirements. Section II further discusses the
use cases and the standard road safety regulations followed by
different countries. In Section III, we categorize and discuss
the existing security approaches in literature for vehicle OTA
updates. Section IV provides a comparative analysis of OTA
updates in terms of scientific contributions as well as industrial
developments. Finally, we identify the open issues for OTA
updates in Section V and provide conclusion in Section VI.
II. OVERVIEW OF OTA UPDATE
In this section, we present an overview of the OTA update
procedure. Specifically, in Section II-A, we briefly discuss the
software update procedure. Section II-B presents the security
issues and challenges of the OTA software update technique.
We discuss different use cases in Section II-C. Finally, in
Section II-D, we describe the standard regulation and type
approval regulation compliance laid down by the various
countries for safety and security of the passengers.
A. Background
Generally, the entities involved in the ecosystem of software
update industry for car are: Car, Cloud Server, Mobile Phone,
OEM, Spare part OEM, Software Distributor (SD), Car Owner,
Service Center, Insurance Company and Law and Enforcement
Personnel [45]. We broadly categorize the software update pro-
cedure into two types: local update and remote update. Here,
by local update method, we mean the traditional software
update technique, where cars are brought to the service center
and a car mechanic updates the software using dedicated tools.
Figure 3 depicts the sequence of steps performed during local
software update procedure. The main drawback of local update
method is that, it is time and resource consuming, resulting in
high cost of labour and customer dissatisfaction [46].
On the contrary, in remote update method, connected ve-
hicles allow updating of the software running on their ECUs
over-the-air, and the car users can update the software any-
where without having to go to the service center or repair shop.
Figure 4 illustrates the remote software update procedure.
The main advantages of remote update method or OTA-based
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Fig. 3. Local software update procedure.
technique are that, it is fast and cost effective [47], [48].
Further, OEM can diagnose the car based on the data received
through over-the-air from the car. Remote updates involve
complicated techniques that include many steps, such as,
secure transfer of the updated transfer along with installation
and verification on the specified ECU. Each step of the update
process has an impact on the efficiency of the whole update
procedure. It is very important for evaluating the effect of
various solutions on the vehicle operation and analyzing their
performance on real hardware [49]. In future, high complexity
of automotive applications will enforce frequent update of
electronic devices supporting those applications. Therefore,
over-the-air updates are exposed to potential attack surfaces
and thus, there is a need for providing stringent requirements
with respect to both safety and security in connected vehicular
communication [50].
Recently, with the booming of wireless technology [51],
[52], secure OTA software updates has been proposed for mo-
bile devices [53], [54], [55], [56], specially smartphones [57],
[58]. However, there are significant differences between OTA
software updates for cars and smartphones in terms of reli-
ability, heterogeneity, usages and installation procedure. The
differences are as follows:
• Reliability. In vehicles, as ECUs are highly interde-
pendent, OTA software updates need more stringent
requirements for reliability than OTA software updates
for smartphones. If in any case, the vehicle fails to
update the software of ECUs properly, the vehicle may
not be driven. On the contrary, in smartphones, if any
application fails to update properly, then it barely affects
the functionality of the other applications. Thus reliability
of the OTA software update procedure for vehicles is
extremely important compared to the smartphones.
• Heterogeneity. ECUs in vehicles are highly heteroge-
neous in terms of memory, computing power and security
capability than the smartphones. For example, the ECU
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Fig. 4. Remote software update procedure.
for engine control does not have much memory capacity,
whereas the ECU for autonomous driving control requires
a sufficient memory as it consists of many logic circuits.
Therefore, such heterogeneous characteristics of ECUs
should be taken into consideration during OTA update
procedure in vehicles.
• Installation procedure. Another major difference is the
installation procedure of updated software. Generally, in
vehicles, TCU downloads the updated software package
from the cloud server. After successful downloading,
the TCU at firsts verifies the software package and
subsequently distributes the software to the appropriate
ECUs. Thereafter, the ECU installs the received software.
On the contrary, the smartphone device is in charge of
downloading and updating itself. Particularly, application
program interface in smartphones, downloads the updated
software and installs it into the system.
• Usage. Diversity in usages of the smartphones and the
vehicles play a crucial role during OTA software upda-
tion. In the case of a smartphone, it is generally turned-
on around the clock and is available for communication
throughout the time. Therefore, smartphones can update
software any time. On the contrary, some people prefer
to drive vehicles on holidays than normal working days.
During the normal working days, vehicles may be parked
in underground parking areas where communication is
quite impossible. If a vehicle takes a long time to switch
on, the battery may go dead. Therefore, considering the
variety of use situations, it is necessary for the vehicle to
shorten the time interval for updating software.
B. Security Issues, Challenges and Requirements
In this section, we discuss the security issues in Sec-
tion II-B1. Whereas, Section II-B2 presents the security chal-
lenges. Finally, in Section II-B3, we discuss security require-
ments necessary for OTA updates in vehicles.
1) Security Issues for Vehicular OTA Software Updates:
For a systematic risk evaluation, it is essential to find out the
vital issues of an OTA software update method. For every
issue, we identify the relevant aspects that need to be secured.
These facts, described below are referred to as security issues.
• Software update package. The software package con-
sists of all the required information for updating a par-
ticular ECU software. Therefore, the most easy way to
5attack the ECUs is by tampering with these packages.
Specifically, the update package needs to be secured in
terms of authenticity and integrity. The freshness of the
update information also needs to be preserved by prevent-
ing replay attacks. Also, every update package contains
the intellectual property of the system manufacturer. So,
the confidentiality of the update package must hold during
the update process. The non-repudiation of an update
transaction is ensured through tracking of the installation
of update packages.
• ECU software. The ECU software defines the functions
of the ECU. The functions of the ECU include the main
functionalities along with the applications that support
the systems use cases. Therefore, it is important that the
integrity of the software is maintained by ensuring that
neither malicious nor unauthorized code gets into the
system. The ECU software also needs protection from
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [59] for protecting the
system availability along with the use cases.
• Vehicle. The vehicle also indicates the functionality of
the system in a more general sense similar to the ECU
software. The security properties of integrity and avail-
ability is also applicable for vehicles.
• Passenger. The most important stakeholder is the pas-
senger in environments that interface with human users.
With respect to passengers, security related as well as
safety critical factors should be taken into consideration.
The integrity of the passenger needs to be provided by
avoiding injury or physical harm to the passenger.
• Backend. The backend consists of all the functionali-
ties that are needed for generating the latest software
packages. The availability of the update process requires
protection for keeping the devices in the field up to date.
2) Challenges for OTA Updates: Automakers are looking to
deliver increasingly connected systems inside and outside the
vehicle. Yet many do not have the technology platform to take
advantage of OTA updates, which require a carefully planned
methodology to develop, deploy, and maintain. And when
a vehicles central gateway the entry point into the software
systems is receiving and sending information, it is more
vulnerable to cyber attacks [60]. Therefore, implementing OTA
updates in vehicles can present the following challenges.
• Data integrity. The update software reaching the vehicles
must meet high standards of reliability. The integrity
of the update software must be protected so that an
adversary is unable to reverse engineer the source code,
or steal data of the software. The communication channel
over which the software images for updates are received
is protected integrity checking, so as to prevent common
attacks such as ”man-in-the-middle” attacks. Also, the
in-vehicle OTA manager which administers the updates,
should be protected against manipulation.
• System security. Cyber threats are dynamic and can
rapidly propagate through the in-vehicle network. The
OTA update solution must be able to prevent external
breaches that could expose vehicle systems and data. The
OTA update system should be fully end-to-end secure,
otherwise, the impact could be very severe. For example,
an automobile company receiving a message that their
whole fleet is infected through OTA with ransomware
and that the vehicles can be unlocked, only if an instant
Bitcoin payment of $50 million is done.
• Connectivity. Real-time, nearly continuous OTA updates
rely on robust connectivity. As data rates are variable,
automakers must ensure that the connection to the vehicle
is robust enough to transmit required updates while
maintaining low costs. Also. due to the wide differences
in bandwidth and signal strengths, the OTA solution must
be capable of completing and verifying update downloads
that were stopped and restarted several times.
• Standardization. A lack of industry-wide standards for
all OEMs adds to the complexity of software design,
interoperability, and connectivity. Handling multiple, in-
dependent components and OS configurations requires
coordination across vendors and efficient, secure com-
munication. International frameworks that define what
the minimum global expectation is for security and for
quality of OTA updates, is highly essential.
• Management. Automobile companies must possess a
strong understanding of the software environment to de-
liver the highly connected experience consumers expect.
Todays cars consist of over one hundred ECUs that need
careful design and management of software development
cycles. During the vehicle development cycle, software
updates need management across a fleet of pre-production
vehicles. In addition, the software and systems are usually
developed across numerous suppliers and several geo-
graphically dispersed design centers. Therefore, the tasks
of managing software development cycles, versions, and
dependencies become very much significant.
3) Requirements of OTA Updates: In this section, we
identify below the security requirements necessary for OTA
updates in vehicles.
• Protection of update package during transmission.
Security must be provided to the update package with
respect to authenticity, confidentiality, freshness and in-
tegrity while it is being transmitted from the backend to
the vehicle.
• Protection of update package while stored. Before
installing the update package received from the manu-
facturer(s), it must be stored safely. Generally, the target
ECU is not utilized during the update process, that might
affect the functionality of the vehicle. Thus, an update
package received from the manufacturer(s) is kept in a
storage within the vehicle until the vehicle is idle for
a significantly long duration of time, which is when
the latest packages can be safely installed. Therefore,
until the duration of time the latest package can be
installed, it requires to be stored securely with respect
to its authenticity, integrity and freshness, as an adver-
sary may obtain access to the ECU, where the update
package is stored and tamper the update package in the
storage directly. In addition to authenticity, integrity and
freshness, sometimes, the confidentiality of the received
6update package may need to be preserved in the vehicle.
• Verification of update authorization. Though the in-
tegrity and authenticity of the update package is pro-
tected, the instance that issued the update package re-
quires additional verification with regard to possessing
of required access rights and authorization of installation
of the update at the target location.
• Protection of the update installation. The delivery and
installation of an update package needs to be traceable
for many cases. As for example, some update packages
may contain errors, resulting in installation problems.
In such cases, the owner of the vehicle requires to
prove that the error is a result of the erroneous update
package installation. Hence, the installation of a genuine
update package needs documentation from both the OTA
backend and the target ECU.
Protection from overloading the backend. The update
packages that are responsible for fixing the safety or
security related critical issues in ECUs, should be made
easily available to intended vehicles. The OEM should
be confident that the distribution backend is safe from
security breaches such as, DoS attacks.
C. Use Cases
In this section, we discuss four use cases which are sig-
nificant in terms of the OTA updates in vehicles. The four
use cases are as follows: recall update process for safety
purposes, update operations for non-safety purposes, recall
updates for improvements in performance and security risk
corrective actions. Recall update process for safety purposes
defines the scenarios when a recall take places due to safety
related issues and the procedures followed thereafter for
informing the concerned authority (e.g., OEM) or the car
owner. Update operations for non-safety purposes are those
that affect the performance or operation of a vehicle but do
not cause any safety related risks to the drive, passengers or
pedestrians. Examples of non-recall operation updates include
wear and tear of shock absorbers and brake shoes. Performance
improvements include the issues that are not related with
safety, security or environmental hazards. For example, the
use of infotainment app and the navigation maps in cars.
Security risk corrective action is concerned with the security
risks that the wireless connections are exposed to with regard
to the recall process. Example of researchers taking over
the control of a Jeep Cherokee remotely [16], is very well
known. Section II-C1 presents uses case for recall update
process. Whereas, in Section II-C2 discusses uses case for
non-safety operation updates. We describe the improvement
in performance in Section II-C3. Finally, we present security
risk corrective actions in Section II-C4.
1) Recall Update Process for Safety Purposes: Most coun-
tries have legal requirements that define how the owner of a
vehicle is informed about a fault that is related to safety. Every
country has a specific definition of a safety defect, though
all of them are very much similar. In the United States (US),
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has
a website where recalls are recorded, so that the vehicle owners
can have a look and determine whether their vehicle also
falls under the recall process. On he other hand, in Europe,
a general product safety directive is present, that includes a
portion on motor vehicles. However, no provision is provided
in the motor vehicles directive for the recall of vehicles that fall
under the jurisdiction of an European Union (EU) body. It is
the responsibility of the individual member states or countries
to check whether the vehicle safety defects are rectified, very
similar to the way it is done in the US.
A defect in a vehicle includes any malfunction in perfor-
mance, component, material or equipment. A safety defect is
generally defined as a problem that is present in the vehicle or
in a component of the vehicle that poses a risk on the safety
of the vehicle and may be poses security risks for a group of
vehicles of similar design, or in list of equipment of the same
type and manufacturer. Official recalls include defects such
as, malfunctioning of brakes, unexpected braking, unexpected
airbag functioning, fuel leak, seatbelt malfunction, detachment
of clutch pedal and so on.
In the US, the responsible authority is the US Depart-
ment of Transportation National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration (US DOT NHTSA) [61] for delivering vehicle
safety standards and notify automobile manufacturers that
have safety-related issues or do not satisfy the Federal safety
standards. NHTSA also performs the task of monitoring the
manufacturers remedial action to guarantee that the recall
campaign process has been completed successfully. The ad-
ministrative records for all safety recalls are maintained by
the Recall Management Division (RMD). The RMD monitors
the recorded recalls for ensuring that the recall is judicious and
the accomplishment rate is satisfactory. The NHTSA may raise
an investigation of the recall if it suspects the facts indicate
a problem related with the recall process execution. A recall
process may take place under the following scenarios:
• Under the initiative of the automobile manufacturer who
determines a safety problem;
• In an investigation based on a court order to recall vehi-
cles, if NHTSA found any safety defect, the automobile
manufacturer must follow the below steps:
– Report NHTSA about the detail safety defect, includ-
ing a detail description of what occurs if fault is not
attended to and what step is necessary to rectify the
fault.
– Report the vehicle owners through registered mail.
– Report the dealers and distributors.
If the vehicle is more than ten years old, the defect must
be rectified free of cost. The automobile manufacturer must
undertake all means to contact the current owner of the
affected vehicles, by utilizing records of its own as well as
that obtained from the state vehicle registration records. A
website of NHTSA is present, where recalls are listed so that
the vehicle owners have the knowledge of the current recalls.
The generalized process adopted in case of safety recalls
are given below:
• In case of recalls, either the OEM or the government
informs each other whether a recall is needed and is to
undertaken.
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quested for a new software release. The task of the OEM
is to perform tests on the new software for checking the
quality of the software.
• The supplier is responsible for sending the software
release to the OEM software update server.
• The OEM performs the task of identifying vehicles
that are affected by the recall. The OEM sends a list
containing all the affected vehicles affected due to recall
to the OEM Customer Relationship Management (CRM)
server. The OEM CRM then associates a vehicle to the
dealer who sold the vehicle or to a suitable dealer listed
by the customer.
• The OEM CRM sends notification to the dealers for
informing them about the required recall along with the
list of the recalled vehicles.
• The recall update software is sent to all the dealers by
the OEM software update server. This is done to facilitate
the dealers for preparing their reprogramming tools for
updating the software.
• All customers of recalled vehicles receive a notice from
the OEM national level sales company. An update notice
is also displayed on the website of the OEM national
level sales company.
• The owner of the vehicle brings the vehicle to the dealer
shop. In the service bay, the technician connects a serial
communication tool to the in-vehicle bus for accessing
the targeted ECU. This allows for initiation of the update
process of the targeted ECU. The technician performs
checks on the targeted ECU for the latest software version
for ensuring that proper re-flashing occurred.
• The corresponding customer information is updated in the
vehicle and OEM customer database. The update status
is reported by the OEM to the government.
The following list [62] shown below is of car models that
experienced software glitches and in most cases were recalled
to be re-programmed.
• 2018: Volvo recalls 16,582 vehicles due to a software
glitch in the vehicle connectivity module that cause error
in location information to emergency personnel in the
event of an accident [63].
• 2018: Honda recalls 232,000 2018 Accord vehicles and
2019 Insight hybrid cars due to a software glitch that
cause malfunctioning of rear camera display [64].
• 2017: FCA recalls 1.25 million trucks due to a software
error that might temporarily disable the side air bag and
deployment seat of belt pretensioners [65].
• 2017: Tesla recalls 53,000 of its Model S and Model X
vehicles due to a parking brake issue [66].
• 2016: FCA recalls 1.1 million vehicles to add additional
transmission control software to prevent inadvertent roll-
aways. During the process, in a tragic accident, Trek actor
Anton Yelchin crushed to death when his Jeep Grand
Cherokee rolls down a slope and pins him against a pillar.
Yelchin’s Jeep was in the recall list but had not been
repaired [67].
• 2016: Volvo recalls 59,000 cars due to a software fault
that cause engine stopping and restarting while the vehi-
cle is in motion [40].
• 2015: Jaguar Land Rover recalls more than 65,000 Range
Rover sport utility vehicles due to a software bug that
might cause unlatch vehicles doors unexpectedly [68].
• 2015: Fiat Chrysler Automobiles recalls 1.4 million ve-
hicles equipped with Uconnect radio head units to fix a
software hole that allowed hackers to remotely control
various vehicle control systems [69].
• 2014: Nissan recalls 990,000 vehicles due to a software
problem in the occupant classification system that might
cause airbags to not deploy in the event of a crash [70].
• 2014: Honda recalls 175,356 gas-electric hybrid vehicles,
in addition to its well-known Fit subcompact, due to a
software bug that puts the vehicle at risk of moving or
speeding abruptly [71].
2) Update Operations for Non-Safety Purposes: There are
some problems that has an impact on the performance or
operation of the vehicle, but do not affect the safety related to
the driver, or passengers of the vehicles or the pedestrians. As
for example, problems related to equipments such as batteries,
brake pads and shoes, shock absorbers do not effect the safety
of the vehicles. No regulations exist in terms of rectification of
the problems related with non-safety operations, except those
that are covered by the warranty period of the vehicle.
There is a class of non-safety related issue that comes
under the regulations in some countries. Polluting emissions
control is one such class of non-safety related issue that falls
under this category. In the US, for example, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) under the Office of Transportation
and Air Quality is accountable for the air pollution compliance
check for all motor vehicles. The new cars sold in US must
possess an EPA-issued certificate stating that the car conforms
to the applicable federal mission standards for controlling
air pollution. In Europe, the EU is responsible for defining
the acceptable emission standards for exhaust emissions of
new vehicles sold in EU member states. The definitions of
these standards are present in a series of EU Regulations and
Directives. The regulations are applicable for all the member
states. Also, the regulations are adopted into the country law
as agreed between the Council and the European Parliament.
Initiation of non-recall updates occur when one or more of
the following scenarios arise:
• The vehicle owner brings the vehicle to the dealer on
experiencing some problem. At the dealer’s end, it is
found that the fault can be rectified using software update.
It is observed that the maybe the software update is
already available for the application or it is planned for
release.
• The OEM identifies a problem that cannot be experienced
by the driver of the vehicle. The ECU supplier requests
for the update and it is downloaded to the workstation
application. The updated software is installed in the
corresponding ECU when the vehicle owner takes the
vehicle for regular service; or,
• The OEM identifies a problem once it receives a diag-
nostic trouble code from the vehicle. The dealer contacts
8the customer and informs him/her that the vehicle can be
fixed once it is brought to the dealer or service station.
3) Performance Improvements: Performance improvements
consist of all those things that are not related to security, safety,
environmental risks. Examples of performance improvements
include updating of the infotainment apps by Mercedes Benz
and varying the different features of the vehicles by Tesla, such
as, rate of acceleration and maximum speed. Another area
of performance improvement is navigation map information
which is stored on board the vehicle and very quickly gets
outdated. If the navigation system is incapable of providing
the required route due to outdated data, the reputation of the
OEM is at stake. OEMs have pursued vehicle owners with
built in navigation systems to pay attention for regular updates,
however this attempt did not yield much result. Some OEMs
provide for map updates that form part of regular visits to
service station, but these updates are restricted to once in
a year. Therefore, OTA update of map navigation data is a
viable option for vehicle owners, where update take place on
a regular basis with no effect on the system performance.
BMW is one such company that provides for OTA updates
of maps to its customers. Likewise, Tesla can make updates
for improvements in acceleration time and location-based air
suspension that remembers potholes.
BMW is one such company that at present is providing
OTA map updates to its customers. The OTA map update is
a standard feature for BMW Connected Drive customers. The
Connected Drive backend communicates at regular intervals
with the onboard unit of the vehicle for initiating download of
map updates. This process allows for requirement of minimal
transfer of data. For connectivity, the onboard units internal
subscriber identification module is used. The navigation sys-
tem remains unaffected by the data transfer process. Upon
completion of the download, the necessary modifications are
applied to the map database.
From the very beginning, Tesla has devised its cars to
facilitate powertrain updates for delivery through OTA. This
facility was made possible due to the fact that most of the
Tesla’s vehicles permit ECU to be access using the vehicles
central telematics system. In July 2015, Tesla announced the
Tesla Autopilot feature that allows for supported cars of self
steering on roads, change lanes on indication by their user
and also find parking spot by themselves. The Tesla Model
S vehicles started receiving Autopilot feature from Tesla in
the US from September 2015. The OTA software update
to Model S Version 7.0 takes advantage of the additional
detection features included in Tesla vehicles manufactured
since October 2014. The owners of the vehicles were informed
that the design of new features was done for enhancing the
driver’s confidence behind the wheel and minimize the driver’s
workload as well as avoidance of hazards.
4) Security Risk Preventive Measure: Previous research
have shown that current wireless connections enable hacking
of vehicles as well as take control of the vehicle locks and
brakes. Recently, researchers [72] were successful in breaking
all the security features of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles and
Sprint. In particular, the researches compromised the UCon-
nect onboard systems of Fiat Chrysler vehicles and wireless
network, so as to take control over the critical functions of a
Jeep Cherokee [16], [73]. The attackers at first took control
over the radio, the climate controls and the windshield wipers.
Next, the attackers moved towards transmission and the brakes.
Finally, the car was brought to a completely stop condition
in St. Louis, Missouri, US. Andy Greenberg, a journalist of
Wired Magazine, who was the driver of the vehicle was a
willing victim of this experiment. He shared his experience in
Wired Magazine that revealed that he was genuinely frightened
when he was helpless in his car and was being remotely
controlled by attackers. This demo attack lead to the selection
of Jeep Cherokee as the most vulnerable vehicle.
In [16], Miller and Valasek found one vulnerable access
point that allows anyone having knowledge about the vehicle’s
IP address obtain access of the chip in the vehicle’s head unit.
The vehicles head unit is the place where the chips firmware
is rewritten and new code is stored. The new firmware is
capable of sending commands through CAN to any of the vital
components, like the engine, brakes, sensors or transmission.
Prior to the test drive, Miller and Valasek informed Fiat
Chrysler Automobile company with sufficient information for
enabling the company to notify a recall process for 1.4 million
vehicles to repair the security hole in their vehicles. Miller also
mentioned that remote updates will provide a new target for
hackers. However, he noted that until now, no mischievous
hackers have taken over vehicles, and also emphasized on the
fact that secured remote updating systems are viable. Though
the progress in remotely securing software updates is slow,
Miller says, that remote software updates for vehicles are
unavoidable in future. With the increase in the number of
software in a vehicle, the security risks enhances. Therefore,
secure remote updates are becoming the most suitable option.
D. Standard Regulations and Type Approval Regulation Com-
pliance
In this section, we describe the safety regulations followed
in different regions of the world. Particularly, Section II-D1
presents the US vehicle safety regulations, while Section II-D2
discusses EU vehicle safety regulations. Finally, Section II-D3
discusses vehicle safety regulations for Asia and Pacific re-
gions.
1) US Vehicle Safety Regulations: In the very early years
of the automobile sector, vehicles in US were lightly regu-
lated by combining both state and private standards. National
regulations were not in existence. The vehicle safety legis-
lation was passed in the form of the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act in 1966. Every state in US was
bounded by the Highway Safety Act of 1966 to generate a
highway safety platform on the lines of federal standards for
improvements in accident records system, traffic control and
driver performance. Starting from January 1967, all vehicles
were issued safety standards following the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966. This resulted in formation
of an agency named as National Traffic Safety Agency whose
task was implementation of the provisions of the new law. In
1970, the National Traffic Safety Agency was given new name
as the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
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dards, that include regulations for tires, brakes, seat belts,
and airbags. NHTSA does not perform verification in advance
about the standards followed by car and parts manufacturers.
The law states that the automobile manufacturer or distributor
of a motor vehicle has to declare to the motor vehicle
distributor during delivery that the motor vehicle conforms
with relevant safety standards. In addition, a tag is perma-
nently attached to the vehicle as the proof of certification of
the vehicle. It is the responsibility of the manufacturers for
examining their vehicles and are accountable for recalls as
well as penalties if they do not abide by the Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards prescribed by the NHSTA. NHSTA
buys sample vehicles from manufacturers and performs tests
on the vehicles. If a non-compliance is observed during the
testing phase, the NHSTA asks the manufacturer to recall the
vehicle model for rectifying the problem.
NHTSA is also responsible for scrutinizing the vehicle
faults that affect safety, in addition to enforcing vehicle
safety standards. The NHTSA office reviews and investigates
complaints of faults raised by vehicle owners, automobile
manufacturers and other relevant sources. If NHTSA confirms
any safety fault, in general, the automobile manufacturers
initiate a recall process. If the automobile manufacturers are
unable to go forward with the recall process, NHTSA initiates
the recall process by iteself. Next, the automobile manufac-
turer perform internal investigations that help in identifying a
whether a vehicle follows the federal safety standard or not.
The automobile manufacturer can issue a recall process by
itself for rectifying a safety defect. The law that is setup for
the vehicle safety program should ensure that the automo-
bile manufacturer of defective vehicle or component, notifies
the concerned owner and rectify the defect without charges.
Generally, in most cases, recalls are initiated by automobile
manufacturers, that is influenced either by the NHTSA findings
or the automobile manufacturers. As an example, in 2016, out
of 1039 proposals for recalls, 92 were issued by automobile
manufacturers influenced by NHTSA while the remaining
947 were issued based on the findings of the automobile
manufacturer.
2) EU Vehicle Safety Regulations: Road safety is a pan
European issue and it is resolved through a cohesive manner
at the EU, national, regional and local level. In EU, road
safety polices are usually designed around three main pillars,
namely, vehicles, users (including pedestrians, cyclists and
drivers), and infrastructure. The coordination of actions and
measures adopted by the different authorities in the various
domains (e.g., traffic rules enforcement, health care, edu-
cation, improvement of infrastructure, vehicle type approval
and road worthiness inspections) calls for strategic planning.
Road safety policy is best defined and implemented under an
overarching strategy that addresses all these aspects. More-
over, road safety stakeholders: road user associations, vehicle
manufacturers and suppliers, infrastructure managers, fleet
operators and other organizations should play an active role
in ensuring road safety. The remarkable progress achieved in
the past decades is the result of measures taken in these three
areas. Today however, as the reduction of road casualties is
stagnating, it is even more evident that further progress can
only be achieved by continued improvement across the various
domains, including that of vehicle safety. For that reason,
the present initiative to significantly improve vehicle safety
performance has to be viewed in close relation with several
other initiatives.
Reflections on whether and how the relevant policy areas
should be amended should be seen as part of the preparation
of an EU road safety policy framework for the period 2020-
2030 (to be proposed as part of the Third Mobility Package
in May 2018). Progress in the reduction of road fatalities and
serious injuries on EU roads has stalled in recent years, and
a revised framework better adapted to this challenge and to
the respective modifications in mobility that are outcomes
of societal trends (e.g.,an aging society, more cyclists and
pedestrians) is needed. This situation leads to the establishment
of a dynamic policy adjustment that is capable of addressing
the major challenges in an effective mechanism throughout
the entire road safety policies. The framework should follow
the Safe System approach. This approach is based on the
principles that human beings can and will continue to make
mistakes and that it is a shared responsibility for actors at
all levels to ensure that road crashes do not lead to serious
or fatal injuries. In a safe system approach, the safety of all
portions of the system, including road use, vehicles, roads
and speeds must be upgraded so that in case one side of
the systems fails, other sides will still safeguard the person
involved. In addition to enhancing vehicle safety features, the
foreseen amendment of two directives on road infrastructure
safety management and on minimum safety requirements for
tunnels, also aim at significantly reducing the number of
fatalities and injuries on EU roads. Thus, the named initiatives
not only share a common horizon, but they also interlink as
the vehicle technology needs to rely on the infrastructure in
order to be operational (e.g., visible road markings to support
lane keeping assistance technologies). Also, the overall vehicle
safety framework should consider the ongoing developments in
connected and automated driving, that are consistently increas-
ing. So, the present exercise is closely linked to Commission’s
strategy on the European Commission’s work on motor vehicle
safety. It is particularly concerned with the safety of the
passengers of the vehicles and the concerned road users. The
European Commission brought in a proposal on 17 May 2018,
for a Regulation of the European Parliament as well as of the
European Council. The European Commission is taking steps
towards enhancing the standard vehicle safety equipment. With
increasing progress in automotive safety in recent years, new
advanced technologies, e.g., emergency lane keeping system,
advanced emergency braking system are being made available
to customers to prevent accidents.
In addition to the role of the European Commission in
paradigm shifting of vehicle safety issues, it also proposed
other passive and active safety developments. All these safety
related enhancements will lead to minimization of injuries due
to accidents as well as better safeguard the passengers of ve-
hicles, pedestrians and cyclists. Trucks are also being included
by providing them with detection systems, and improved side
windows and windscreens. This enhancements will result in
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reduction of blind spots and decrease accidents concerned
with pedestrians and bicyclists. Thus, the new proposed safety
measures seek to improve road safety for all the concerned
stakeholders. Another safety measure adopted is the eCall. The
eCall is an automatic emergency phone call system for motor
vehicles. The function of the eCall is to reduce the time it
takes for emergency services to arrive at the required place.
The automobile manufacturers are required to install the eCall
technology in vehicle models from 31 march 2018. The eCall
technology is envisioned to save many lives and enhance road
safety in Europe. The EU law enforces using of safety belts
by all vehicle passengers and chile restraint systems for all
children.
3) Asia and Pacific Region Vehicle Safety Regulations:
A small proportion of the world’s existing number of motor
vehicle and total road network belongs to the Asian and Pacific
region. It is worth mentioning that inspite of the small figures
with respect to the number of motor vehicles, 235,000 road
deaths occur annually in Asia and Pacific regions, which
is nearly half of the total 500,000 road deaths that happen
annually worldwide. The issue of under reporting in this region
has made it difficult to understand the number of people
injured through road accidents. Reports point out the number
of injured due to road accidents in the order of 3 million to
4 million every year. Death due to road accidents account to
second largest cause of deaths for the core age groups (5-44
years). Road accidents cause countries to spend between 1%
to 3% of their annual Gross Domestic Product. Particularly,
in East Asia, North-East Asia and South-East Asia, increasing
number of road accidents of road users are a matter of great
concern.
Road safety was an issue of serious concern for policy-
makers in the region prior to the launch of the decade of
action for road safety and the 2030 Agenda. To address the
issue, in November 2006, the 1st Ministerial Conference on
Transport adopted the Ministerial Declaration on enhancing
road safety in Asia and Pacific region. The Ministerial Dec-
laration included the aim to save 600,000 lives and to avoid
a significant number of severe injuries on the roads of Asia
and Pacific region between 2007 to 2015. These goals had
not yet been met by 2015, the end of the period covered
by the Ministerial Declaration. The mandate for global road
safety declared the requirement of renewing existing regional
road safety missions, targets and indicators. The modified
regional road safety goals, targets and indicators for Asia
and Pacific 2016-2020 provides important guidance related to
policy design and implementation of the safety objectives. The
mandate also serves the purpose of providing tools that are
used for assessing the outcomes of the implementation of the
road safety rules both at the national and regional levels.
Its overall objective is to achieve 50% reduction of serious
injuries and fatalities arising due to accidents on the roads of
Asia and Pacific region from 2011 to 2020. It consists of eight
goals, namely, (i) building safer vehicles and familiarizing
responsible vehicle advertising, (ii) creating improved the road
safety systems for both regions and nation, (iii) creating road
safety a higher priority policy, (iv) safer roads for common
users, e.g., pedestrians, older people, persons with disabilities,
also building safer roads and reducing the seriousness involved
in road accidents, (v) building the Asian Highway trans-
port network, (vi) managing and enforcing, (vii) enhancing
collaboration and promoting partnerships, (viii) conducting
road safety awareness programs for the drivers and public,
particularly young people.
The Regional Action Program for Sustainable Transport
Connectivity in Asia and the Pacific, Phase I (2017-2021)
includes road safety as one of its thematic areas. In the new
Regional Action Program, the immediate objective under the
road safety theme is to ensure that countries in the area support
each other in order to improve road safety as well as to
follow the commitments under the Decade of Action for Road
Safety and Sustainable Development. Implementation of well
coordinated road safety projects involving multiple sectors is
necessary.
III. SECURE OTA UPDATE TECHNIQUES IN THE
SCIENTIFIC LITERATURES
In this section, we discuss about the contributions and
achievements of the state-of-the-art secure OTA software
update techniques. We classified the existing secure OTA
software update solutions into five categories based on the
security mechanisms used by the researchers. Figure 5 presents
the different classifications, which we analyze in this section.
Particularly, in Section III-A, we discuss the symmetric key en-
cryption based OTA software update techniques. Section III-B
presents the hash function based OTA software update tech-
nique. In Section III-C, we describe the existing blockchain
based OTA software update technique. Section III-D discusses
the RSA and steganography based secure OTA software update
techniques. We discuss the combination of symmetric key
and asymmetric key encryption based OTA software update
technique in Section III-E. In Section III-F, we put forward
the existing Hardware Security Module based OTA software
update technique. Finally, we describe a recently published
secure software repository framework based OTA update tech-
nique in Section III-G.
A. Symmetric Key Encryption Based Techniques
Mahmud et al. [74] proposed a secure software updation
technique for intelligent vehicle. The proposed technique
initially shares a set of link keys among the OEM, Software
Supplier (SS), and vehicle. Next, before any software updation,
a link key is used to establish a secure connection between
SS and vehicle for sharing symmetric key. Using the shared
symmetric key, the SS encrypts the software and sends it to the
vehicle. To increase security, the authors proposed to send the
copy of encrypted software at least twice at random intervals.
Upon receiving the two copies of the encrypted software, the
vehicle first decrypts them and installs one of them. Further,
in [75], the authors analyzed the proposed technique to justify
the sending of two copies of encrypted software.
Mansour et al. [76] designed a diagnoses and secure soft-
ware updation system, called AiroDiag for connected vehi-
cle. Figure 6 presents the architecture of the AiroDiag. The
main entities in AiroDiag architecture are: OEM, Car and
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Fig. 5. Taxonomy of secure OTA software update techniques.
Internet. AiroDiag uses symmetric key technique, particularly,
advanced encryption standard to secure the communication
during software updation. In AiroDiag, key is stored in the
database located in OEM end. The airodiag server always
remains connected with the internet, and is kept always ready
for any connection request from the car end. In AiroDiag,
usually, the software update process is triggered only by the
driver/client. Once the software update process is triggered,
the vehicle first establishes a secure connection with the OEM.
Next, the vehicle informs the OEM about the current version
of installed software. In return, OEM sends the new software
version for installation. In case, a new software is available,
OEM triggers the software update procedure, and establishes
a secure connection with the car. The performance of the
proposed system is measured through simulation experiments.
The results show that based on the size of the software file,
the AiroDiag takes 5.14s∼7.85s to update the software in the
car.
ECU 1 
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ECU n 
AiroDiag
Car 
Internet
AiroDiag
Server
Database
New Softwares
Received
Diagnostic
Information
OEM
Fig. 6. BC-based architecture for secure OTA update.
B. Hash Function Based Techniques
Nilsson and Larson [77] proposed a secure OTA firmware
update protocol for connected vehicles. The authors considered
four entities, i.e., car, portal, Internet and wireless tower in
their architecture as shown in Figure 7. Here, the portal is
the main unit responsible for communication with the cars
using wireless connection. In the proposed protocol, first, the
updated binary file is divided into number of data fragments.
The authors next created a hash chain by hashing each
fragment in reverse order. Finally, the portal encrypts each
fragment of the hash chain using a pre-shared encryption key
before transmitting them to the vehicles. In particular, the
portal uses cipher-block chaining as the encryption technique
considering the limited resources in the vehicle. Even though
the proposed protocol ensures security from eavesdrop, in-
tercept and modification attacks, however, it did not ensure
security from denial-of-service attack.
Portal
Over the
cable
Internet
Over
the air 
Interface Interface
Car
Fig. 7. Portal-based communication model for secure OTA update.
In another work, Nilsson et al. [78] developed a secure OTA
firmware update framework for in-vehicle ECUs. The designed
framework comprises of a vehicle and a trusted portal. The
trusted portal issues firmware updates including a verification
code (generated using a hash function) to the vehicle. The
vehicle downloads the firmware using a security protocol.
Next, before flashing ECUs ROM, the vehicle verifies the
downloaded firmware using a hardware virtualization tech-
nique. Particularly, using hardware virtualization technique,
the proposed framework verifies downloaded firmware in
two stages, running simultaneously in two systems, namely,
control system and functional system. The main strength of
the designed framework is that the downloaded firmware is
verified before it is flushed into ECUs ROM. However, the
framework fails to detect if the modified firmware is sent from
a trusted source.
The authors in [79] introduced a key management technique
using hash function for software update procedure. The authors
used the multicast technique to update the software on a
group of nodes. Also, they proposed a rekeying protocol in
order to distribute the keys for some specific nodes within
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the group. However, the proposed technique fails to provide
security against number of attacks, including replay attack.
C. Blockchain Based Techniques
Recently, in an interesting work, Steger et al. [80] in-
troduced BlockChain (BC)-based architecture to address the
security and privacy issues of OTA software updation for smart
vehicles. Figure 8 shows the proposed architecture used in
this work. The main entities of the architecture are: OEM,
service center, car, cloud server and SD. In the proposed
architecture, initially, all participating entities form a cluster.
Each cluster consists of a number of cluster members and
a cluster head. Cluster heads are connected with each other
through a overlay network to avoid requirement of any central
management. In the proposed architecture, SD triggers the
software update process once the new software is developed.
First, SD sends a store request with own signature to the
cloud server. After successful request validation, cloud server
sends an acknowledgement including own signature and a file
descriptor required during software uploading process to the
SD. Once the new software is uploaded into the cloud server,
the SD creates an update transaction in a BC block consisting
of information about the location of the new software on the
cloud. The SD also includes the public key of the OEM, signs
the transaction with private key and ultimately, broadcasts
the encrypted transaction to vehicles. To validate applicability
of the proposed architecture, the authors presented a proof-
of-concept implementation. The results show that the pro-
posed architecture performs better than the certificate-based
architecture. Further, in [81], Dorri et al. discussed several
automotive use cases. They also provided an overview of
the probable attack scenarios, and the way the proposed
architecture mitigates those attacks.
Overlay
Car
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Service Center 
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Inter­Cluster 
Intra­Cluster 
Fig. 8. BC-based architecture for secure OTA update.
D. RSA and Steganography
Mayilsamy et al. [82] proposed an integrated method com-
bining cryptography and steganography to secure OTA soft-
ware update for connected vehicles. Figure 9 shows that OEM,
service center, car and cloud server are the entities involved
in the proposed method. The proposed method uses two levels
of security while uploading a new software from OEM to
the cloud server. Specifically, the first level, uses a modified
RSA algorithm to encrypt the new software file. In the second
level, the cipher text of the first level is hidden along the
edge regions of the cover image using steganography. Finally,
the cloud server stores the stego-image. During the software
update process of the car, the service center first downloads
the stego-image. Thereafter, the service center performs the
necessary decryption and installs the updated software into
the car. The authors validate the performance of the proposed
technique using MATLAB with Python as backend platform.
The simulation results reveal that at the OEM’s end, the time
required to encrypt file sizes of 1kB, 15kB and 20kB are 3.05s,
6.95s and 8.03s, respectively. On the contrary, at the car’s end,
the time required to decrypt file sizes of 1kB, 15kB and 20kB
are 5.43s, 905.05s and 1590.92s, respectively.
OEM Service Center 
Cloud Server
Car
Fig. 9. Architecture for secure OTA update used in [82].
E. Combination of Symmetric Key and Asymmetric Key
In a state-of-the-art work, Steger et al. [83] proposed
a framework, called SecUp, for secure and efficient OTA
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software update for connected car. Figure 10 depicts the
proposed secure architecture for SecUp. The involved entities
of the proposed architecture are: OEM, service center, car
and mechanic (with a handheld device). SecUp uses both
symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography to secure the
OTA software process. Precisely, the authors proposed to
use an asymmetric key cryptographic technique, e.g., RSA
to secure the communication between service center and car
during unicast communication. On the contrary, the authors
proposed to use a symmetric key cryptography, e.g., session
key based technique for multicast communication from the
service center to several cars (through handheld device) in
order to enable parallel software update. In SecUp, a mechanic
authenticates with the handheld device using a NFC smartcard
and a PIN code. Here, service center generates the session key
and sends to each car using a unicast data packet encrypted
using the public key of car. Next, with the intervention of the
mechanic, updated software is transferred to the car from the
service center. After receiving the software, the car verifies
the software before installation. The authors, in this work,
assume that keys are stored in a trusted platform module
after a key exchange procedure in a controlled environment
and IEEE 802.11s mesh network as communication media.
Further, the authors extended the work in [84] by designing
a Wireless Vehicle Interface (WVI) prototype to connect car
with the service center. Basically, the function of WVI is to
interconnect the vehicular communication bus, e.g., Controller
Area Network and ECUs of the connected car with the
IEEE 802.11s mesh network. The performance of SecUp is
measured through real-world experiments using the Volvo
ECU. The results revealed that the update duration for different
types of softwares varies between 6.77s∼33.19s. Here, update
duration is the time required for transferring the updated
software from the service center to the respective ECU.
OEM Mechanic
Handheld
Device
Car
Service
Center 
Fig. 10. SecUp architecture for secure OTA update.
F. Hardware Security Module
Idrees et al. [85] proposed a protocol for secure OTA soft-
ware update for connected car. The proposed protocol exploits
the Hardware Security Module (HSM) in order to store the
cryptographic key and perform cryptographic operation, e.g.,
encryption during software update. The network model con-
sidered in this work consists of the following entities: OEM,
service center and Car. In the proposed protocol, initially,
service center remotely diagnoses in-vehicle ECUs. After suc-
cessful diagnosis, service center sends request to the OEM for
decryption key in order to decrypt the downloaded software.
OEM sends the key encrypted using the public key of the ECU.
The ECU downloads the software from the service center
and verifies the authenticity of the downloaded software. If
the verification is successful, ECU proceeds with installing
the updated software removing the old software. The authors
did not provide any qualitative and quantitative analyses of
their proposed protocol. Similar to [85], in another work,
Petri et al. [86] put forward a secure OTA software update
mechanism based on Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a kind
of HSM. In the proposed technique, initially, the gateway
ECU downloads the updated software from the remote server.
Next, the ECU validates the downloaded software using pre-
defined hash in the TPM. Once the validation is successful,
ECU transferred the updated software to the target ECU
for installation purpose. The main benefit of using TPM is
that it supports computation of many popular cryptographic
algorithms, e.g., RSA, SHA, AES [87]. The main limitation of
the proposed techniques [85], [86] is that, every ECU requires
an HSM/TPM, causing additional cost for implementation.
G. Secure Update Framework
Recently, Kuppusamy et al. [88] designed a secure OTA
software update framework specially for connected cars, called
Uptane. In Uptane, an OEM uses a cloud server (i.e., reposi-
tory) in order to distribute the updated software to ECUs in the
form of images and metadata. Here, an image is a collection
of code and/or data that allows an ECU to operate properly.
Whereas, a metadata contains number of information, e.g.,
cryptographic hashes and length, to validate the authenticity
of an image as well as other metadata. The core of the
Uptane design is the adaptation of one of the secure software
repository framework The Update Framework (TUF) [89].
The key principle of TUF is separation of duties in different
roles. Specifically, in Uptane, the repository administrator
performs different duties via five different roles, i.e., director,
root, release, projects and timestamp in order to distribute
responsibilities. To increase compromise resilience, repository
administrator bundles all updated images and metadata files
signed by each of the five roles of the administrator using five
private keys and stored in the cloud server. Thereafter, the
primary ECU such as, ECU of Telematic Control Unit (TCU)
downloads and unpacks the bundle and allocates the updated
files to the appropriate secondary ECUs. After receiving the
updated files, secondary ECU verifies the image and after
successful verification, the old software is updated by the new
software. Recently, in two state-of-the-art works [56] and [90],
researchers have pointed out that Uptane is vulnerable to
rollback attack due to lack of proper verification mechanism
during update software installation at the car end. In case of
rollback attack, an ECU installs a different software package
version than the most recent version.
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present a comparative study by analyzing
the scientific contributions and industrial developments of OTA
updates in cars. Specifically, here we present a comparison
of the scientific contributions that deal with secured OTA
update techniques in cars. In addition, we also discuss the
present scenario of OTA updates related with the different car
industries.
1) Scientific Contributions: We present a comparative study
of the various scientific contributions in the field of securing
OTA updates in cars through Table I. In Table I, we particularly
mention the works that we discussed in Section III. In the
scientific literatures, authors used different experimental setups
to measure the performance of the proposed techniques, hence
posing a difficulty for finding a common platform to evaluate
them. Further, due to lack of vivid information, a quantitative
analysis of the existing mechanisms is infeasible. Therefore,
for shake of convenience, we compare the evaluation setup
used in the existing literatures to measure the performance of
their proposed mechanism. We compare the evaluation setup
based on the three parameters, namely, WVI, ECU and coding
technique. It is worth mentioning that WVI and ECU are
the hardware component of the connected car. It is worth
noting from the Table I that except [74], [77], all the other
works measured the performance of their proposed techniques
through simulation experiment. Further, we notice that except
Steger et al. [83], [84], none of the works used real-world
hardware, e.g., WVI and ECU to measure the perform of the
proposed mechanism.
2) Industrial Development: On an average, an automotive
vehicle today comprises of approximately 100 ECUs and
over 100 million lines of software code. And this number
is growing rapidly since the introduction of Connected Cars.
Market experts suggest that by 2020, there will be 300 ECUs
in a car [91], managing most of the functions within a car.
In such a complex automotive electronics and software set-
up, the need to remotely manage and update the vehicle ECU
software becomes all the more important. At a time when
the automotive industry is witnessing some disruptive trends,
including electrification and autonomous/self-driving vehicles,
it is important for OEMs to implement efficient software
management strategies.
The market reports are clearly suggesting that the future of
OTA in automotive looks bright. This is especially applicable
for the automotive industry which is shifting its gear towards
software driven development of the autonomous systems. The
research and market reports have confirmed that OTA updates
market is set to grow at a CAGR of 58.15% during the period
2018-2022. Also, many of the leading automotive players are
already on the path of making seamless and secure update
of OTA in automotive systems, a reality. In 2017, Bosch had
come up with new features required to carry out wireless, OTA
updates for cars of the future. These OTA updates ranged from
various control units and in-vehicle communication system, to
latest encryption techniques and the Bosch IoT cloud.
In this section, we present a comparative study of OTA
update characteristics for car companies such as, Tesla, BMW
and Mercedes Benz. In addition, we also present a comparative
analysis of in-car features that support OTA updates in auto-
mobile companies. Particularly, Table II present a comparative
analysis of OTA update characteristics for various automobile
companies. We notice that only five automobile companies,
namely, Tesla, BMW, Mercedes Benz, Audi and General
Motors offer OTA software update for their cars. Rest of the
companies update the software for their cars locally either
in a service center (using dedicated tools) or garage (using
USB sticks). Further, we notice that except BMW, all the
four automobile companies use 3G data connectivity during
OTA software update. However, only Mercedes Benz allows
customer/driver to trigger OTA updates.
Table III presents a comparative analysis of in car features,
e.g., infotainment, maps and navigation that support OTA
updates in automobile companies. We notice that Tesla is the
leading automobile company that supports more number of
OTA updates for various car features including infotainment,
auto emergency break, forward collision warning, power man-
agement, maps and navigation. Different from Tesla, other
four automobile companies support OTA update for either
infotainment or maps and navigation.
V. FUTURE SCOPE
To complete our overview of securing OTA updates for cars,
in this section, we present the technical challenges and open
directions for future research.
• Distributed Software Distribution. The security of the
software distribution, from a software provider to an
OEM along with the vehicles is still an open area of
research. At present, some OEMs, for example, Tesla
use Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels between
the vehicle and the OEM server for OTA updates. This
technique supports adequate data protection, but also
needs a dedicated communication link between the
vehicle and the OEM. The point to point dedicated
communication link between the vehicle and the OEM
may effect the privacy of the end user. To establish trust
within networks, other automotive security architectures
make use of certificates. These centralized techniques
are not appropriate for highly distributed scenarios
comprising of large number of vehicles. So, software
distribution during OTA updates need to be more
distributed, to safeguard the security primitives required
for such a safety critical infrastructure.
• Latency Minimization During Software Installation.
Many techniques exist for software installation of the
OTA updates, where, a latest image is installed on the
ECU. For example, the installation of a latest software
image on the ECU through the wired in-vehicle bus
network requires more than five times longer than
the software distribution using the Block Chain. The
latency involved during software installation is of
primary concern for such time critical autonomous cars.
More research work is needed to be done in this area,
that focus om latency minimization during software
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TABLE I
EVALUATION SETUP OF EXISTING LITERATURES FOR OTA UPDATES IN CARS
Scientific Literature WVI ECU Coding Technique
Mahmud et al. [74], [75] Information Not Available Information Not Available Information Not Available
Mansour et al. [76] Beagle Board (Version xM,
Revision B)
Arduino Duemilanove Python
Nilsson et al. [77], [78] Information Not Available Information Not Available Information Not Available
Steger et al. [80] BeagleBone Black Board Infineon AURIX Java and C
Mayilsamy et al. [82] Information Not Available Information Not Available MATLAB and Python
Steger et al. [83], [84] BeagleBone Black Board Infineon AURIX Java
Idrees et al. [85] Information Not Available Information Not Available Information Not Available
Kuppusamy et al. [88] Information Not Available Information Not Available Information Not Available
TABLE II
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OTA UPDATE CHARACTERISTICS
Car Companies S/W UpdateTriggered by Whom Update Notification
Driving Possibility
during Update Process
Tesla [92] Tesla
Sent through an embedded AT&T 3G data
connection or a Wi-Fi router for Model S cars No
BMW [93] BMW
Customer receives notification through
Connected Drive system present in the car No
Mercedes Benz [94] Costumer
Update notification sent through an embedded
Verizon 3G data connection for C and S class cars No
Audi [95] Information N/A
Update notification sent through an embedded
T-Mobile 3G data connection for its A3, A4, A5,
Q2, Q5 and Q7 cars
No
General Motors [96] Information N/A
Chevy Volt model uses the OnStar Verizon 3G
data connection for receiving update notification No
TABLE III
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE IN CAR FEATURES THAT SUPPORT OTA UPDATES
Car
Companies
Maps and
navigation Infotainment
Power
Management
Options
Location
based
Air
Suspension
Settings
Forward
Collision
Warning
Traffic
aware
Navigation
Blind
Spot
Warning
Auto
Emergency
Braking
Dashcam
Feature
Tesla D D D D D D D D D
BMW D 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Mercedes
Benz 5 D 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Audi D 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
General
Motors 5 D 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
installation.
• Key Management. In majority of the existing systems,
the operational strategies depend on the basic trust
involved with pre-programmed keys. Different attacks
can be prevented by regular updating of the keys keeping
in mind the long lifetime of vehicles. Additionally,
the security issues involved in the safe generation and
programming of keys are not trivial. Thus, future research
work need to focus on the aspect of key management
that include operations such as, key generation, key
distribution for ensuring secured OTA updates. Also,
privacy protection is desirable from the customer point of
view. To facilitate privacy protection, a set of anonymous
keys could be preloaded to every car. The car owner can
utilize a key at a time for a particular time interval, and
alter the keys in such a manner that attackers cannot
track the key owner. The number of keys that need to
be present in the key set, and how frequently the keys
should be varied in order to reach a decent level of
privacy, needs further thorough investigation.
• Realization of Parallel or Partial Software Updates.
Existing works proposed different systems that allowed
remote OTA updates by using unicast communications,
i.e., a dedicated connection between the OEM and
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a particular vehicle. Therefore, innovative features
like, partial or parallel software updates are not being
implemented to a satisfactory level. Contrary to these
works, till date, Tesla is the sole vehicle manufacturer
offering a solution for OTA software updates for almost
all the possible areas. Tesla uses a wireless network
to transfer the latest software from the servers located
at the OEM side to a Tesla car. However, using the
dedicated communication links between the OEM and
the car, simultaneous installation of software in several
cars and on different ECUs in parallel is not possible.
• Ethics and Privacy. In general, it is expected that the
information collected for a particular case is considered
according to the ethical information standards based on
the specific communication context. A major issue that
remains unsolved is how to ensure that the software
running in a vehicle is ethical. Therefore, in future,
researchers should concentrate on the aspects of ethics
and privacy while securing OTA updates for cars.
• Vehicle Relationship Management. An emerging trend
in OTA update in cars, is the Vehicle Relationship Man-
agement (VRM). VRM promises to improve vehicle data
management through a more transparent and streamlined
process. The VRM component consists of VRM Por-
tals (content management, administration and reporting),
Cloud-based, multi-tenant VRM platform (with modules
for data analytics/management, Vehicle, user and compo-
nent management) and software agent (resident in target
car).
VI. CONCLUSION
A report released by ABI Research says that, by 2022 there
would be 22 million vehicles on the road that can get a FOTA
upgrade. Thus in the future, firmware and software updates
could be more common, more secure and more streamlined.
In this survey paper, we investigate the security issues and
challenges of OTA updates in connected vehicles. We provide
a comprehensive survey of the underlying concept of OTA
updates together with the standard regulations for road safety
currently followed by different regions in the world. At first,
we provide for a description of the relation of OTA updates
with connected cars followed by a brief discussion on the dif-
ferences between local updates and OTA updates in vehicles.
Further, we discuss the security issues, challenges and
requirements for OTA updates in vehicles. Then, we surveyed
the state-of-the-art-works that developed security techniques
for carrying out OTA updates in vehicles safely. Next, we
present a comparative analysis of the scientific works in
literature dealing with vehicle OTA updates. We further pro-
vide for a comparative analysis of the current scenario of
OTA updates with respect to car companies. Finally, potential
research directions for OTA updates in vehicles mainly related
to security are identified. This analysis of security issues and
challenges of vehicle OTA updates will introduce new and
promising perspectives and methodologies for future research
in this area.
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